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Robert H. Borkt
The basic issue in this exchange' is whether Professors Gould and
Yamey have materially weakened the case I made for the legality of
resale price maintenance (r.p.m.) desired by a manufacturer who is
not in collusion with other manufacturers. 2 I believe they have not.
In this response I will try to demonstrate that their Rejoinder's stric-
tures on welfare economics are irrelevant, its price theory mistaken,
and its demands for certainty one-sided and unreasonable.
I. Welfare Economics
My position is that consumer welfare is the only proper criterion
for antitrust generally and, specifically, for deciding the legality of
r.p.m. I argued this position primarily within the context of judge-
made rules under antitrust laws structured like those of the United
States,3 but I am quite willing to follow Professors Gould and Yamey
into the wider context of legislative decision-making. Discussing both
legislatures and courts, Gould and Yamey quite correctly state that
"we must distinguish two areas in which the criteria are to apply: (1)
in the formulation of antitrust policy; and (2) in supplying the courts
(or other implementing agency) with operational rules."4 I will make
that distinction explicit in the discussion that follows since it is crucial
to legitimate government that the division of functions between the
two institutions be observed. Whether the legislature or the courts
take up the problem of r.p.m., however, I believe r.p.m. of the type
under discussion 5 should be made lawful.
t Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1948, J.D. 1953, University of Chicago.
1. The relevant prior pieces in the exchange are Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division 1, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), and The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division 11, 75 YALe L.J.
373 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Part I and Part 11, respectively]; Gould and Yanicy,
Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L.J. 722 (1967), and Bork, A Reply to
Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L.J. 731 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Reply).
2. Professors Gould and Yamey seek, through a disavowal of "any policy prescription,"
to avoid the burden of sustaining a position of their own. I find the disavowal un-
persuasive, and not merely because of the tone of their pieces and the prior writings of
Professor Yamey. See, e.g., B. S. YAmEY, THE ECONOMICS OF RESALE MAINTENANCS (1954),
especially at 129-30. If their "presumption" against r.p.m. is not a "policy prescription," it
certainly bears a remarkable family resemblance to one.
3. See Bork, Part 1, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 829 et seq. (1965), and Bork, Reply, 76 YALE L.J.
731, 740-41 (1967).
4. Gould and Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing: A Rejoinder, 77 YAL
L.J. 936, 945 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Rejoinder].
5. The reader is reminded that we are debating the desirability from the consumer's
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A. The Standard Welfare Analysis
I proceed on the conventional hypothesis that antitrust is concerned
with competition because a competitive regime provides society with
the maximum output that can be achieved at a given time with the
resources available. For the sake of clarity, it may be worth restating
in simplified form the arguments that underlie this hypothesis.
Under a competitive regime each productive resource tends to
move to that employment in which the value of its marginal product,
and hence the return paid to it, is greatest. Output is then maximized
because there is no possible rearrangement of resources that could in-
crease consumer want satisfaction. Though changing wants and tech-
nologies prevent the attainment of this equilibrium, competition
permits the closest approximation at any given moment and the con-
tinual pursuit of the shifting equilibrium point.
Monopolies (including cartels) interfere with this situation because
the unified industry maximizes its net returns by keeping its output
below the level which would be attained under a competitive struc-
ture. The resulting divergence between price and marginal cost
means that the values of the marginal products of the resources em-
ployed by the monopolist are higher than they are in competitive in-
dustries. Consumers would be better off if resources moved from com-
petitive industries to the presently monopolized industry until the
values of marginal products were the same everywhere.
This model does not imply that change is undesirable. As producers
achieve greater efficiency in resource use, the society becomes richer.
A consumer-oriented antitrust law, therefore, should permit those
market structures, agreements, and acts which reflect or create effi-
ciency while prohibiting those which create restrictions of output. 6
R.p.m. does not eliminate any competition at the manufacturing level
and therefore cannot introduce or enlarge any ability to restrict output
there. As I have attempted to show in prior pieces, r.p.m. cannot be
expected to restrict output at the reseller level for the simple reason
that no sane manufacturer would use it if that were its net effect. A
viewpoint of vertical price fixing, that is, r.p.m. which is not the tool of a cartel among
resellers or among manufacturers. Hereafter references to "r.pam." should be taken to
indicate only this variety.
6. Though this statement will suffice for the purposes at hand, it is oversimplified. It
is possible that movement from a condition in which marginal cost and price wvere equal
to one in which they diverged would, nonetheless, be beneficial to consumers. A monop.
olistic merger, for example, would be preferable to the maintenance of a competitive
structure if it created efficiencies which outweighed the restriction of output. Antitrust,
however, does not try to measure directly the relative influences of restriction of output and
efficiency in particular situations, but wisely settles for general rules. These rules should,
of course, be based upon the probable effects of phenomena of various types.
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manufacturer will want r.p.m. only if it increases reseller efficiency in
distributing his product, and my prior pieces specified the ways in
which r.p.m. can enhance distributive efficiency. It follows from these
considerations and the model of welfare analysis sketched out above
that r.p.m. desired by a manufacturer should be lawful. I turn now
to those objections raised by Gould and Yamey which consist of efforts
to show that my welfare criteria are inadequate. These objections have
primarily to do with the theory of second best, income distribution,
changes in consumer tastes, and the output criterion.
B. The Theory of Second Best
Gould and Yamey and I appear to be in agreement that the theory
of second best does not provide criteria usable by courts in the decision
of individual antitrust cases. It follows, and this seems not in dispute,
that any consideration of second best must be at the level of overall
rule-making.7 We may turn, then, to ask whether the theory of second
best provides any guidance to the legislature (or to a court free to act
legislatively) in the formulation of rules about r.p.m.
The theory of second best, as Gould and Yamey summarize it, states
that so long as there are invulnerable monopolies in an economic
system, it may or may not be worthwhile to attack and destroy those
monopolies which are vulnerable. The reason is that if we attack vul-
nerable monopoly A, thereby equalizing the value of the marginal
products as between A and competitive industries, the factors re-
quired for A's expansion of output may have come from invulnerable
monopoly B where their marginal products were higher. We have, if
that should be the case, done consumers a disservice.
Gould and Yamey have stated the theory as a caution against as-
suming that a public policy against restrictions of output necessarily
benefits consumers. Whatever weight one assigns to that caution,
it clearly does not apply to my contention, grounded in basic price
theory, that r.p.m. creates efficient utilization of resources. It is theo.
retically possible that the more efficient utilization of resources within
a firm or an industry might shift demand or resources in such a way
as to lessen consumer welfare, but our centuries-long experience of in.
7. The theory of second best, therefore, does not alter the tasks, and should not affect
the analysis, of courts charged with applying the Sherman Act to r.p.m. I have argued
that the Sherman Act must, for reasons intrinsic to the judicial process, be taken to rest
upon standard consumer welfare concepts which are applied through criteria provided
by price theory. Bork, Part I, 74 YAIz L.J. 775, 829-47 (1965). I have also contended that
this result is indicated by the legislative history of the statute. Bork, Legislative Intent
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAw & ECON. 7 (1966).
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creases in wealth associated with changes in processes and techniques
and the alteration of products certainly indicates that such results are
improbable. No legislature would be justified in framing a rule
against cost-cutting improvements or alterations in the composition of
products because of speculations of this sort. Unless r.p.m. is showsm to
be different from other methods of improving distributive efficiency
or changing product composition there is no warrant for raising the
theory of second best in this discussion.
Gould and Yamey have in fact introduced a theory which, if taken
seriously, undercuts the significance of their conclusions dramm from
price theory, not mine. They contend r.p.m. may restrict output
within an industry, but second best suggests that restrictions may not
be an objection from a welfare standpoint. I do not press this latter
point against them since I have doubts about the probability of the
result which second best merely shows to be possible.8
The theory of second best, therefore, does not alter the appropriate
welfare criteria if my price theory is correct. If it is not, I have no wish
to take advantage of the escape hatch second best might provide. Sec-
ond best thus has no relevance to this discussion.
C. Income Distribution
Gould and Yamey apparently suggest that, once the theory of second
best has eliminated the criterion of consumer welfare, a legislature
may properly rely upon the concept of income distribution to decide
8. For the sake of completeness, let us assume arguendo that r.pm. does usually restrict
output. What then is the relevance of the theory of second best? The legislature may make
one of three possible assumptions about the impact of second best upon standard welfare
analysis. If the theory leaves the legislature convinced that the best general rule is still
that of standard welfare analysis, r.p.m. should be illegal. If the legislature thinks the
theory suggests a reversal of the rule derived from standard welfare anal)sis, which I
believe no one really suggests, output-restricting r.p.m. should he lawful. If the legislature
concludes that the proper counsel of the theory of second best is complete agnosticism
concerning the effects of restrictions of output on consumer welfare, and this seems to
be the assumption upon which Gould and Yamey operate, then, of course, the interests
of consumers drop entirely out of the policy equation. We now have a situation in which
the only relevant parties are a manufacturer who does not wish to deal except upon a
certain contractual term and at least one reseller who wishes to deal without agreeing to
that term. The issue then is whether the state shall leave the parties free to make
whatever bargain they can or shall intervene to say the demanded term is illegal because
one of the parties would prefer to be relieved of it. I have no doubt that the state
should leave the parties free and should enforce the term if it is ultimately incorporated
in the bargain. This conclusion rests upon a general presumption in favor of freedom of
contract where, as here, there is nothing which can realistically be termed force, fraud,
or mistake, and where, by definition in this situation, the interests of third parties are not
knowable and hence not weighed. Thus, the only case in which r.p.m. should be unlawful
is where second best is regarded as too insubstantial to modify standard welfare analsis
and where r.p.m. restricts output. Since I have agreed to these criteria from the beginning.
consideration of second best has altered nothing.
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the legality of r.p.m. I have shown that the necessary condition to this
argument does not exist because the theory of second best does not
question the value to consumers of r.p.m. which creates efficiency.
Consumer welfare remains a usable criterion for judging r.p.m., there-
fore, and the field is not cleared for income distribution to assume the
role of the decisive criterion by default. In this section, however, I
will go further and attempt to demonstrate that the concept of income
distribution should not, in any event, play any part in deciding the de-
sirability of r.p.m. It is a subject to be considered after the legality of
r.p.m. has been decided on other grounds.
Concern about income distribution may arise either because of a
general policy with respect to the acceptable overall range of income
disparities in a society or because the society wishes to take away in-
come derived from a particular practice which it wishes to inhibit.
The first cause for concern about income distribution tells us nothing
about the desirability of r.p.m. A court has no business determining
the range of acceptable income disparities in a society and, if it did,
would have no reason to select the prohibition of r.p.m. as its means
of controlling the disparities. The legislature, worried about the gen-
eral problem of disparities, has at hand general remedies, such as taxa-
tion, subsidization, and welfare programs to achieve its ends. A gen-
eral incomes policy, in itself, suggests nothing about particular
income-producing activities. On such grounds r.p.m. is indistinguish-
able amidst an infinite range of such activities.
But I suspect Gould and Yamey are focusing on r.p.m. as a practice
to be inhibited because of its particular effects. This interpretation of
their remarks is reinforced by their reference to the award of damages
to a "wronged party" and the footnote which apparently suggests
theft and forgery as analogies.9 The fallacy here lies in the assumption
that the policy-making body usually selects those acts which are to be
made illegal or for which damages may be claimed according to some
standard of income distribution. Income distribution, by itself, does
not distinguish between "fencing" stolen goods and normal brokering
as means of gaining income. Theft and forgery, to take Gould and
Yamey's examples, are not defined as wrongs because they alter in-
come distribution but because they have other effects which are re-
garded as deleterious. If r.p.m. creates efficiency and so increases soci-
ety's wealth, there is no more reason for a legislature to classify it as an
undesirable practice, analogous to a tort or crime, than there is to clas-
9. Gould and Yamey, Rejoinder, 77 YA.a L.J. 936, 947 & n.22 (1968).
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sify the more efficient rearrangement of machinery as a thing wrong
in itself simply because it produces income. If r.p.m. restricts output,
it injures consumers and may properly be made illegal. The subject
of income distribution then becomes relevant for the first time and
may suggest a provision for the recovery of damages as a way of pre-
venting men from deriving income from antisocial conduct.
Thus, price theory, which indicates the effect of r.p.m. on resource
allocation, and welfare analysis, which indicates the effect of resource
allocation upon consumers, control the decision as to the desirability
of r.p.m.10 The subject of income distribution becomes relevant only
after that decision is made. Hence the topic has no relevance to the
present discussion.
D. Changes in Taste
Professors Gould and Yamey offer an argument which amounts to
no more than this: "Bork has relied on standard welfare analysis. He
is, for that reason, confined to policy prescriptions which can be de-
rived rigorously and with certainty from that model. He is, therefore,
caught out because promotional activities which change consumers'
tastes cannot be measured on a stable yardstick derived entirely from
standard welfare analysis."'1 There are some non sequiturs in that ar-
gument, but I will deal with it in its own terms. Gould and Yamey
have further claimed that I have not offered argument but only asser-
tion on this point.'2 That charge I cannot accept.
In the first place, it is quite clear that Gould and Yamey have mis-
understood the thrust of my argument and of the very paragraph they
quote. I have viewed the reseller activities induced by r.p.m. as pro-
viding an economic good-information, entertainment, convenience,
etc.-which is just as much an output of the economy as any other
10. Only in the special case in which the legislature determines both that r.p.m. usually
restricts output and that the theory of second best leaves the effect of such restrictions
utterly unknowable will the concept of consumer welfare become inoperative. But even
here the concept of income distribution would decide nothing. R-p.m. creates larger
incomes for the manufacturer and most resellers, and perhaps less income than would
accrue in r.p.m.'s absence for some resellers. This fact seems to say nothing about r.pm.'s
desirability. The arguments in the text about the handling of overall income disparities
seem applicable, and there seems no way to define such shifts in income as in themselves
wrong. There are an infinite number of shifts due to commercial practices which we do
not attempt to prohibit when consumer welfare is not thought to be involved. This
special case seems open to solution only by reference to the presumption in favor of
freedom of contract mentioned note 8 supra. But the outcome of this case does not, in
any event, affect my argument which rests on the identification of r.p.m. as a means of
creating efficiency.
11. Gould and Yamey, Rejoinder, '77 YAL L.J. 936, 938-39 (1968).
12. Id. 938.
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product (or service).13 R.p.m., like vertical market division, is the
means by which the manufacturer induces reseller provision of this
product by making sure that the reseller can recover the product's
cost. The process is closely analogous to the social recognition of prop-
erty rights as a means of inducing economic activities. Contract law
delegates to private persons the power to create property rights be-
cause of their superior knowledge of the efficiencies to be gained in
particular situations. R.p.m. is best viewed as an instance of this gen-
eral principle. The net effect of r.p.m. is to increase the amount of an
existing product (or, more accurately, to enlarge the information com-
ponent, for example, of a composite product consisting of a physical
item and information about the item) which is offered to consumers.
This analysis does not involve changes in consumer tastes any more
than the offering of a greater amount of any existing product (or the
change of any product's composition) changes tastes. The situation,
therefore, is measurable by the "stable yardstick" Gould and Yamey
require. If some consumers prefer to purchase the additional informa-
tion, or other product, offered jointly with the physical item through
r.p.m., the output of the economy has increased.
Gould and Yamey have not met this analysis, though the view of
r.p.m. as changing the composition of products offered consumers ap-
pears not merely in the paragraph of my Reply they cite but in my
prior pieces in this series.14 So far as I can tell, Gould and Yamey deal
with the reseller activity induced by r.p.m. as though it did not count
as an economic output but was instead merely something that changes
tastes. I am not sure that this view of promotional activities is ulti-
mately comprehensible, though it incorporates a common mode of
speech. When a youth has classical music explained to him so that he
comes to prefer Bach to the Beatles, have his tastes been changed or
has the new information enabled him to relate classical music more
effectively to existing tastes? It seems to me to depend upon whether
"tastes" are defined as quite specific preferences or as basic psychologi-
12. I alluded to this view of promotional service as a product in my discussion of
promotional activity as changing the composition of the product offered. It is an extract
from this passage which Gould and Yamey quote and attack. Bork, Reply, 76 YALm L.J.
731, 733-34 (1967). Moreover, in Bork, Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966), I repeatedly ana-
lyzed market division and price fixing as means of providing information and services,
which should be recognized as economic outputs, and even referred to r.pam. as a means
of securing a uniform product which included sales effort as part of the product. Id.
at 454-56. See generally Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213
(1961); Telser, Supply and Demand for Advertising Messages, 56 Am. EcoN. Riv. PAI'E w
457 (1966).
14. See note 13 supra.
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cal traits. If the former, every new product or changed product has
the effect of changing tastes and standard welfare analysis provides no
rigorous way of judging it. If the latter, changes in taste infrequently,
perhaps never, occur,,and it is certainly unlikely that reseller promo-
tion induced by r.p.m. is capable of changing such basic tastes. I am
afraid that Gould and Yamey are operating with a concept, "changes
in taste," that is so unrefined as to be practically useless in this
discussion.
But I will assume, for the moment, that "changes in taste" refers to
quite specific preference shifts and that the activity ("promotion")
which induces such shifts is not in itself to be counted as an economic
output. This pair of assumptions does indeed make it impossible rigor-
ously to derive from the standard welfare model a conclusion that con-
sumers are always better off after promotional activity has shifted their
preferences. It is impossible to compare the value of two different
outputs of the same economy which are responses to two different dis-
tributions of tastes. This observation, however, has little to do with
appropriate public policy toward r.p.m. Two considerations indicate
that the attempted consumer persuasion, which will sometimes succeed
and sometimes fail, should be permitted to proceed.
I know of no ultimate standard by which it can be said that existing
tastes are best and changes should be inhibited. We certainly do not
make that assumption in the not-explicitly-economic sector of our
lives. Nor does the fact that commercial persuasion is motivated by
self-interest differentiate it from much, perhaps most, non-commercial
persuasion. The appropriate rule (when we are dealing with products
as to which consumer sovereignty is deemed desirable, i.e., not addic-
tive drugs and the like) would seem to be to leave sellers free to try to
persuade and consumers free to respond or not. Whether or not con-
sumers respond in a particular case, I know of no acceptable guide to
consumer welfare other than the consumers' judgment of the matter.
There is a further point about the consistency of public policy that
should be made. Apart from the merits of any of the arguments set
out above, the fact is that we permit promotional activity in myriad
forms in our society. If r.p.m. has as one of its major functions the
more economical performance of that activity, I can see no rationality
in singling it out for prohibition.
My answer to Gould and Yamey, then, is that I have analyzed the
product or output made possible by r.p.m. in a way which makes it
possible to state, on the basis of the standard welfare model, that con-
sumers are better off. Should they reject that analysis, however, they
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have not shown promotion to be harmful, only that nothing rigorous
can be said of it in terms of the welfare model. I have shown, I believe,
the reasons why, in that eventuality, public policy should be to permit
r.p.m. The change-in-taste concept turns out to alter nothing.
E. The Output Criterion
Since Gould and Yamey understood that I was grounding my argu-
ment in welfare theory, and since that theory refers to the output of
the economy as a whole, I am surprised that they managed also to be-
lieve that my output criterion related to the individual firm rather
than to the economy as a whole. The misunderstanding is of no prac-
tical significance, however, for they and I have consistently argued the
issues relevant to resource allocation in the total economy, i.e.,
whether or not r.p.m. is likely to create restrictions of output.
To dispel any possible lingering confusion I will summarize the
method by which a court should apply standard welfare assumptions.
The judge should apply the concepts of price theory to the agreement,
structure, or activity called into question in order to determine
whether it is likely to create a restriction of output (create or increase
a divergence between price and marginal cost). If not, the presump-
tion is that the agreement or activity was motivated by the desire to
achieve a more efficient utilization of resources. The judge may wish to
go on, as I have in these articles, to understand how more efficient
resource use is achieved, but in strict logic he need not. The presump-
tion is that the creation of or increase in a divergence between price
and marginal cost restrictions the output of the industry and, more im-
portantly, of the economy as a whole, while more efficient resource use
increases both outputs. In some cases both effects may be present and
the judge will have to estimate roughly the net effect. This is not our
present case, however, for my argument is that the r.p.m. desired by a
manufacturer not in collusion with other manufacturers has only the
effect of creating efficient resource use. Inferences from price theory to
welfare conclusions are proper and made necessary by the fact that the
court has no feasible means of measuring directly the sizes of efficien-
cies, divergences between marginal costs and prices, or outputs.
The result of this sorting out of Gould and Yamey's suggested quali-
fications to standard welfare analysis is to perceive that when ex-
amined with any precision these qualifications evaporate as guides to
public policy with respect to r.p.m. The standard welfare model which
I outlined in the beginning of this piece appears to be entirely ade-
quate to the task of judging r.p.m. The next question is whether
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within that model, the application of the concepts of price theory sup-
ports or weakens the case for r.p.m. I turn to that question now.
II. Price Theory
Professors Gould and Yamey have not undertaken to attack the en-
tire case I made for r.p.m. but to pose certain objections which seem
to them to outweigh the affrmative case. Since these objections do not
seem valid, I will not attempt to estimate what would be the pros and
cons of r.p.m. if they were valid. I will deal first with the attempted
rehabilitation of the four Gould and Yamey counter-examples and
then with other specific objections.
A. The Four Counter-Examples
The first Gould and Yamey counter-example consisted of an attempt
to show that advertising differed from promotion induced through
r.p.m. because advertising is asserted to be a fixed cost which does not
affect output while r.p.m. increases marginal costs and does affect out-
put. There was no limitation on this counter-example as originally put
and I responded by pointing out that advertising would also be a
marginal cost since any seller plans his advertising expenditures and
output at one time, recognizing the interdependence of his decisions.
Furthermore, the seller varies his expenditures and his output as experi-
ence teaches him their relationship more precisely.
It now appears, however, that Gould and Yamey are using a novel
definition of fixed costs. Such costs are not identified by the fact that
they cannot be varied in the relevant time period but by a state of
mind gratuitously attributed to the entrepreneur. Advertising be-
comes, according to Gould and Yamey, a fixed cost simply because a
hypothetical manufacturer insists upon so regarding it. This argument
is not merely inconsistent with standard price theory, but is also di-
vorced from reality and constitutes a device by which any and all mar-
ginal costs can be made fixed when that suits the debater's purposes.
We are asked to imagine a world in which a manufacturer is able to
select the "best" advertising campaign without considering its relation
to his sales and is inclined thereafter to take his level of advertising
expenditure as a "given."' 5 One can only note that this man has a
beautifully sequential mind, one which keeps in separate compart-
ments decisions which crucially affect each other. In any world outside
15. Gould and Yamey, Rejoinder, 77 YALE L.J. 936, 939-40 (1968).
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that of the hypothetical he would doubtless have to be accompanied
by a guardian. Granted an equivalent freedom to postulate irrational
economic behavior, I can show that advertising may be the only vari-
able cost. My manufacturer decides first upon his "best" output and
then regards that factor as "given." Henceforward, the only expendi-
ture he will vary is his advertising. Thus, paralleling Gould and
Yamey, we see that advertising is variable and wages, depreciation,
raw materials, electricity, and so on and on, are all fixed costs and do
not affect output. Postulating normal intelligence in the manufac-
turer, however, we would expect him to determine his advertising
campaign, its effect upon his sales, and his proper output jointly. Ad-
vertising expenditure is then a marginal cost.10
It should be noted, moreover, that if we accepted Gould and
Yamey's hypothetical as a possibly accurate version of reality, the re-
sult would be to show that, on this ground at least, r.p.m. is preferable
to advertising. It is in the social interest that output should vary with
real marginal costs. Gould and Yamey suggest that r.p.m. has that ef-
fect automatically but advertising may not because the manufacturer
is free to disregard the impact of advertising on his sales. If that were
significant, it would merely mean that advertising leaves the manufac-
turer free to misallocate resources by failing to regard it as what it is,
a variable or marginal cost.
The first counter-example is either unrelated to reality or demon-
strates the social superiority, in this respect, of r.p.m. to an advertising
campaign.
The second and third counter-examples are sought to be rehabili-
tated by the curious maneuver of saying that my analysis of them rests
upon an assumption of perfect ease of entry into all industries. This
is simply not the case, as a reading of my prior response will show.17
The second counter-example purported to demonstrate that all the
manufacturers in an industry might individually choose r.p.m. only
to discover that they were all worse off for it. Without mentioning
entry, I pointed out that the situation would not be stable because it
would then be in the interests of some manufacturers and resellers to
abandon r.p.m. This is true of the manufacturers and resellers already
16. Advertising can be made into a fixed cost, of course, by viewing it all as past ad-
vertising whose results were not as expected. Then the manufacturer would make new price
and output decisions and would be unable to vary the past advertising expenditure, but
that is certainly not significant. All past expenditures are fixed in this sense. Even past
payments for promotional activities through r.p.m. are fixed costs.
17. Bork, Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 731, 754-36 (1967).
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in the industry. If I had discussed entry, I might properly have pointed
out that the situation envisaged by Gould and Yamey would have
made entry more attractive, but I believe the counter-example to
stand refuted without reference to entry.
The third counter-example was offered by Gould and Yamey to
show that a monopolist manufacturer might use r.p.m. to slow the
entry of large-scale resellers. My response did not posit any degree of
ease or difficulty of entry but was and is that r.p.m. would not be an
effective tool for the purpose specified since, whatever the entry con-
ditions, r.p.m. would not make them more difficult but would either
be neutral or make entry more attractive. The clarification of this
point leaves the second and third counter-examples and my answers
to them precisely where they were after the last exchange.
The fourth counter-example imagined the non-collusive use of
r.p.m. by oligopolists to lessen the unsettling effects upon their non-
competitive way of life of price competition at the reseller level. I
pointed out that this tactic would introduce service and promotional
competition which would lessen the benefits to be derived, that the
practice had serious costs, and that the benefits to be derived were in
any event less than would be attained through collusion. The non-
collusive use of r.p.m. for this purpose, therefore, seems even less
profitable than its use as a tool for policing actual collusion between
manufacturers, a case which Gould and Yamey had agreed was
unlikely.18
The whole counter-example is unrealistic in any event. If the oli-
gopolists are able to work out techniques of this sort without collusion,
and are then able to withstand continued reseller pressure for greater
profit margins which would lead to pushing one product over the
others, they hardly need the device of r.p.m. They can equally well,
by parallel and non-collusive oligopolistic behavior, refuse to give
price concessions to finance the competition at the retail level. I doubt
very much that this tight formation flying without collusion is as com-
mon as some commentators suppose, but if it is, it should lead to solu-
tions of the sort just mentioned rather than to elaborate schemes
which cost more and accomplish less.
18. Gould and Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L.J. 722, 725
n.10 (1967). I do not understand the distinction made in or the basis for their conditional
withdrawal of that agreement in Rejoinder, 77 YALE L. 936, 942 (1968). It seems to me ob-
vious that the non-collusive use of r.p.m. as a means of suppressing competition is less likely
than its collusive use by a manufacturers' cartel. See Bork, Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 731, 737-38
(1967). I need not rehearse here the arguments indicating the improbability of even the
collusive use of r.pm. by manufacturers wishing to inhibit defection from a cartel. See
Bork, Part II, 75 YAr. L.J. 373, 411-15 (1966).
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B. The Side Effects of R.P.M.
Gould and Yamey point out that the manufacturer using r.p.m. may
have effects upon other goods sold by the same resellers and hence ef-
fects upon the resellers and upon consumers.1 9 Gould and Yamey dis-
cuss these side effects as if they were both inevitably detrimental and
unique to r.p.m. In fact, they are neither.
The beneficial aspects of r.p.m. for resellers are apparent. When a
manufacturer finds r.p.m. profitable, most of his resellers will also find
it profitable as to his goods. This is a plus factor Gould and Yamey do
not mention which will offset the detrimental side effects they posit.
But there is no basis, in any event, for their supposition that the side
effects themselves should usually be detrimental. They suppose it
likely that resellers constrained by r.p.m. as to some products will be
able to attract fewer customers to their stores and so will sell less of
other products. On the contrary, if the r.p.m. succeeds by inducing
successful promotional activity, as it must if the manufacturer is to
find it worthwhile, more persons will be attracted to that store, and
the reseller's prospects for selling other goods will be enhanced. This
last remark is speculative but less so than the adverse possibilities im-
agined by Gould and Yamey. It is inconceivable that the manufacturer
using r.p.m. should wish to weaken his outlets through the side effects
of r.p.m., and certainly resellers who were injured would make their
supplier aware of that fact.
Gould and Yamey's ruminations about the possible side effects of
r.p.m. are idle, in any event, since almost all methods of distribution,
as well as of production, have such effects. Both national advertising
and reseller price cutting, for example, clearly have side effects upon
resellers' sales of other products, and these effects may be either bene-
ficial or harmful. Side effects occur when the manufacturer pays the
salaries of salesmen for the promotion of his products in retail outlets,
gives his resellers promotional materials, or contributes to reseller
advertising of his products. No reason has been advanced why r.p.m.'s
side effects are either usually harmful or different from any other
19. Gould and Yamey, Rejoinder, 77 YALE L.J. 936, 942-44 (1968). Some of the side effects
imagined by Gould and Yamey seem impossible. They suppose, for example, that r.pam.
may be less beneficial than a manufacturer using it expects because "resellers [may] use
the additional margin to cut prices of other goods or to provide services In respect of
other goods." Id. 944 n.19. If it paid resellers to cut the prices of other goods, they
would do so in any event. Additional income from price-maintained products is no more
relevant to that decision than additional income from stock investments. Precisely the
same analysis applies to the provision of promotional services with respect to other
products.
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distributive strategy. It is difficult to take this argument of Gould and
Yamey seriously.
C. Manufacturer Supervision of Reseller Activities
I am at a loss to know why Gould and Yamey think it significant
that r.p.m. involves control by one firm of one of the activities of an-
other. So does every contract or working arrangement between two
firms. It is a ubiquitous form of integration known as contract integra-
tion and has great economic advantages in many situations over owner-
ship integration. Such control is often essential to the creation of effi-
ciency.20 The analogy between the use of r.p.m. and other normal
management decisions, therefore, is not false but exact.
III. The Question of Standards of Proof
Professors Gould and Yamey and I have engaged in a discussion of
the appropriate public policy toward r.p.m. Their latest piece raises
the issue of the standard of proof to which discussants are to be held
and I think it proper to dose with a few words on that subject.
In my original piece, I attempted to demonstrate that there seems
no reason to think r.p.m. would create restrictions of output but, on
the contrary, there seem many reasons to think it enables the provision
of an activity (read "service" or "product," if that seems preferable)
that consumers are willing to pay for. I have argued the case in terms
of the probabilities shown by the application of basic price theory. I
do not contend that I have proved the case for r.p.m. in the sense that
further analysis cannot possibly show me to be wrong. I do maintain
that my arguments have not been answered by Professors Gould and
Yamey. But Gould and Yamey seem to require something more of me;
repeatedly they use language which seems to demand something ap-
proaching a mathematical demonstration that my case for r.p.m. holds
in every imaginable circumstance. They insist, for example, that I
prove the proposition: "R.p.m. always decreases (or else leaves un-
changed) the divergence between price and marginal cost." 2 '
I confess an inability to supply proof of the requisite mathematical
and final nature. But the demand that I should is wholly unfair and
unreasonable. I have offered an analysis based on conventional welfare
20. See PL Coase, The Nature of the Finn, in RzA~r s xN PiRi TnEony 331 (Stigler
and Boulding eds. 1952).
21. Gould and Yamey, Rejoinder, 77 YA.LE L.J. 936, 946 (1968).
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and price theory. Gould and Yamey have failed to shake that analysis
in any respect. That should be enough. I do not suppose that anyone
has demonstrated rigorously that plant investment, research and de-
velopment, the hiring of salesmen, or any other hopefully profitable
activity that businessmen undertake "always decreases (or else leaves
unchanged) the divergence between price and marginal cost." It seems
to me sufficient in such matters to show that there is no coherent the-
ory which leads one to predict a restriction of output and that there is
a coherent theory which predicts an efficient use of resources.
To require more than this is to create a presumption against every
business activity until someone has rigorously demonstrated that
never, under any circumstances, could that activity have an adverse
impact. Policy discussion cannot intelligently be carried on under such
rules. I would ask Professors Gould and Yamey to take to heart their
own excellent dictum: "In advocating policy one must, of necessity,
make do with what theoretical and empirical knowledge is available.
We may bemoan our incomplete knowledge, but we shall wait forever
if we wait on complete knowledge before tackling practical ques.
tions. '22 Measured by that standard, I submit, the affirmative case for
r.p.m. has been demonstrated.
22. Id. 945.
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